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I. PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION OF UTAH. 
On January 28, 1985, W. S. Hatch Company ("Hatch") filed 
an action in the Utah Federal District Court against American Salt 
Company ("American Salt") to collect tariff charges for transporta-
tion services rendered for American Salt. On April 2, 1985, 
American Salt filed a Verified Petition with the Utah Public 
Service Commission (the "Commission") claiming that Hatch's salt 
tariff was unreasonable, discriminatory and should not be applied 
under the circumstances of this case. Hatch filed a motion, with 
supporting affidavits, to dismiss American Salt's Petition on the 
ground that Hatch, as a matter of law, was obligated to charge the 
tariff rate. In view of Amercan Salt's Verified Petition, the 
Affidavits filed by Hatch and factual admissions of the parties, 
the Commission, in accordance with Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, considered Hatch's Motion to Dismiss as a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
After a hearing, the Commission issued a Report and Order 
dismissing American Salt's Petition. The Commission held that the 
salt tariff was reasonable and that Hatch was legally obligated to 
collect the tariff rate irrespective of any oral or written 
agreement which may have provided for a lower rate. The Commission 
denied American Salt's Application for Rehearing. 
The appellant, American Salt, has appealed the 
Commission's Report and Order dismissing its Petition. 
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II. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
From April 16, 1984 to May 3, 1984, Hatch hauled 406 
truckloads of salt for American Salt from the Amax ponds to the 
American Salt plant at GrantsviLle, Utah. At the time the services 
were performed, American Salt knew that part of the haul was over a 
public road (R. 0028); however, Hatch operated under a mistake of 
fact, believing that the haul was entirely over private roads and 
was therefore an unregulated haul. (R. 0325, 0344). Because Hatch 
assumed that an unregulated haul was involved and American Salt had 
represented to Hatch that between 75,000 and 80,000 tons of salt 
would be hauled, the parties orally agreed on an hourly rate of 
$59.80 per hour. (R. 0318, 0325). 
Sometime after the haul was completed Hatch discovered 
that part of the haul was over a public road, making it a regulated 
haul, and, by Utah statute, one that had to be billed at the 
current tariff rates on file with the Commission. (R. 0328). 
Accordingly, Hatch sent a bill to American Salt for the cost of the 
haul calculated in accordance with the tariff rate. American Salt 
refused to pay the tariff rate, and Hatch filed an action in 
Federal Court to recover the sums due and owing under the tariff. 
(R. 0344). 
On April 2, 1985, one day before American Salt's Answer to 
Hatch's Amended Complaint was clue, American Salt filed a Verified 
Petition with the Commission claiming that Hatch's salt tariff was 
unreasonable, discriminatory, and should not be applied under the 
circumstances of this case, and should therefore be set aside. 
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(R. 0070). Hatch filed a Motion to Dismiss American Salt's 
Petition on the ground that Hatch, as a matter of law, was 
obligated to charge the tariff rate. (R. 0182). American Salt 
then filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings in the federal action 
pending a ruling by the Commission. Counsel for Hatch agreed to 
the stay until the Commission had ruled on American Salt's Petition. 
Hatch and American Salt filed numerous legal memoranda 
with the Commission. On July 2, 1985 a hearing was held before the 
Commission. On September 12, 1985, the Commission issued its 
Report and Order dismissing American Salt's Petition. (R. 0343; 
Addendum, Exhibit A). 
The Commission held that: 
(4) The salt tariff on file with the 
Commission is fair and reasonable, and Hatch is 
legally required to collect the charges for 
transportation services as provided in said 
tariff. 
(5) Any oral or written agreements to 
charge a rate higher or lower than the 
published rate, even assuming that such was 
agreed to by Hatch and American Salt, is void 
and unenforceable. 
* * * 
(7) American Salt is required under the 
laws of the State of Utah to pay [Hatch] the 
tariff rate for the transportation services 
performed and other charges as set forth in the 
tariff . . . . 
(R. 0347; Addendum, Exhibit A, p. 5). 
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III. LEGAL ISSUE PRESENTED BY AMERICAN SALT'S APPEAL. 
The only issue presented by American Salt's appeal is 
whether Hatch can collect the tariff rate for transportation 
services rendered for American Salt, in accordance with the tariff 
filed with and approved by the Commission, notwithstanding an oral 
or written agreement for a rate lower than the tariff rate. 
This Court should affirm the Commission's Report and Order 
because the applicable Utah statutes, Utah case law, and all other 
case authority, both state and federal, clearly establish the legal 
right of a regulated carrier to collect the tariff rate 
irrespective of agreements for a lower rate. There is no law to 
the contrary. 
IV. UTAH STATUTE, APPLICABLE CASE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY AS 
ANNOUNCED BY THE UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REQUIRE A 
COMMON CARRIER TO CHARGE AND COLLECT THE APPLICABLE TARIFF 
RATE. 
A. Utah Statute and Case Authority Prohibit Hatch From 
Charging or Collecting Compensation Different From the 
Tariff Rate. 
As stated above, the Commission determined the reason-
ableness of the tariff and its applicability to the transportation 
of salt by Hatch for American Salt. (R. 0347; Addendum, Exhibit A, 
p. 5). The Commission also determined that there was no genuine 
issue as to the facts that: (1) the haul performed by tfatch for 
American Salt was, in part, over a public road; (2) that American 
Salt knew that the haul was partially over a public road; and 
-4-
(3) that Hatch believed the haul to be made entirely over private 
roads. (R. 0345; Addendum, Exhibit A, p 3.) 
Utah statute provides: 
No common carrier shall charge, demand, 
collect or receive a greater or less or different 
compensation for the transportation of persons or 
property, or for any service in connection 
therewith, than the rates, fares and charges 
applicable to such transportation as specified in 
its schedules filed and in effect at the time; 
nor shall any such carrier refund or remit, in 
any manner or by any device, any portion of the 
rates, fares or charges so specified, except upon 
order of the commission as hereinafter provided, 
or extend to any person any privilege or facility 
in the transportation of passengers or property 
except such as are regularly and uniformly 
extended to all persons. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-6(2) (1953) (emphasis added). 
The Utah statute prohibits a common carrier from charging 
a rate other than the current rate in effect under its published 
tariff schedule. Hatch is under a statutory obligation to charge 
American Salt the tariff rate for the salt hauled. 
In the case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Sterling H. 
Nelson & Sons, Inc., 552 P.2d 649 (Utah 1976), this court held that 
a carrier can collect the tariff rate irrespective of a lower 
quoted rate. In this case the shipper had requested a rate 
quotation from the railroad. The rate quoted by the railroad, and 
used by the shipper in a bid to a third party was lower than the 
correct tariff rate. After the transportation services were 
performed, the railroad sued for the tariff rate. This court 
granted the railroad's claim, and held that the shipper was not 
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entitled to maintain a counterclaim that the railroad's negligence 
in quoting a lower rate had caused the shipper damage. 
B. American Salt's Argument That the General Tariff Is 
"Discriminatory" Is Without Merit. 
American Salt argues that the application of the general 
salt tariff is discriminatory because at certain times in the past 
a special lower tariff rate involving hauls for Morton Salt had 
been approved by the Commission. 
In accordance with tariff Utah statute, "No common carrier 
shall charge, demand, collect or receive a greater or less or 
different compensation . . . than the rates . . . specified in its 
schedules filed and in effect at the time; . . . " Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-3-6(2)(1953) . 
Discrimination in tariff rates can only occur where one 
shipper is charged the tariff rate and another shipper is charged 
something other than the applicable tariff rate. There can be no 
discrimination where the applicable tariff rate is charged. 
By statute, the Commission is authorized to make certain 
changes, modifications or exceptions to the general rate 
structure. Utah Code Annotated § 54-3-7 provides that no charge 
can be made greater or less than the rates on file with the 
Commission, "provided, that the Commission may, by rule or order, 
establish such exceptions from the operation of this prohibition as 
it may consider just and reasonable as to any public utility." 
Special rates which the Commission approves from time to time are 
temporary in nature and apply only to particular hauls. They do 
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not replace or supersede the general tariff. The special rates for 
Morton Salt had been approved by the Commission and was the tariff 
applicable to those particular hauls. 
The applicable rate as determined by the Commission was 
the general salt tariff rate. (R. 0345; Addendum, Exhibit A, 
p. 3). There was no lower special tariff rate for this haul 
approved by and filed with the Commission. (R. 0346; Addendum, 
Exhibit A, p. 4). In this regard, the Commission, in denying 
American Salt's Application for Rehearing, stated: "The tariff 
rates must be charged and collected unless prior specific 
authorization from this Commission is obtained." (R. 0414; 
Addendum, Exhibit B, p. 2). 
The Commission, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, has determined (1) that Hatch had a salt tariff on file that 
had been properly submitted to and approved by the Commission and 
which had been found to be just and reasonable; (2) that pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 54-3-6(2)(1953), no common carrier shall 
charge, demand, collect or receive compensation different than that 
specified in the tariffs filed with the Commission and in effect at 
the time the transportation services are rendered, (3) that under 
the law, American Salt is charged with a knowledge that any haul 
over the Utah public highways is subject to the laws of the State 
of Utah and therefore subject to the applicable tariff provisions 
on file with and approved by the Commission, and (4) that American 
Salt is required, under the laws of the State of Utah, to pay the 
tariff rate for the transportation services performed and other 
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charges as set forth in the tariff. (R. 0346, 0347; Addendum, 
Exhibit A, pp. 4-5). 
The applicable tariff rate was charged. No other or 
different tariff had been approved by the Commission. American 
Salt's argument of discriminatory rates is without any legal merit. 
C. Case Authority From Other Jurisdictions Affirms the Right 
of Hatch to Collect the Applicable Tariff Rate. 
The case law interpreting similar state and federal 
statutes is uniform in upholding Hatch's right to collect the 
applicable tariff rate. 
(i) Case Authority Interpreting Other State Statutes. 
The courts have expressly recognized that tariffs are not 
a contract between the carrier and the shipper, but, in fact, carry 
the force of law. In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
Bouziden, 307 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1962), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated: "A tariff, so long as it 
remains in effect, binds both carriers and shippers with the force 
of law." _Id. at 234 (footnote omitted). Similarly, in Illinois 
Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Sankey Brothers, Inc., 67 111. App. 3d 
435, 384 N.E.2d 543 (1978), aff'd 78 111. 2d 56, 398 N.E.2d 3 
(1979), the court stated: "A tariff is a law, not a contract, and 
has the force and effect of a statute." Ld. at 545. 
The strong public policy in favor of preventing discrim-
ination among shippers, which has resulted in tariffs being 
considered as having the legal force of a statute, has also 
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resulted in the rule of law that a carrier may recover the full 
tariff rate, regardless of the circumstances for any undercharge or 
misquotation of rates. 
Perhaps the most succinct statement of this rule is found 
in Western Transportation Co. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 
682 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1982) in which the court stated: "If a 
tariff is unambiguous it must be enforced according to its terms, 
regardless of the equities, ..." Id. at 1235. 
In Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Marty, 
353 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1960), the railroad brought an action for 
unpaid freight charges. The shipper counterclaimed for damages 
because of the negligent misstatement of the applicable freight 
rate. 
The court applied a Colorado statute substantially similar 
to the Utah statute: No public utility could "charge, demand, 
collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for 
any product or commodity furnished or to be furnished, ..." than 
those specified in its schedules on file and in effect at the time 
the services were performed. Id,, at 1096. The court first noted 
that in the absence of the Colorado statute, the agent's quotation 
would be binding on the railroad. The court continued: 
However, the general rule which appears to be 
followed uniformly without significant deviation 
is that statutory policy against discriminatory 
rates and rebates precludes a shipper from 
asserting a claim, counterclaim or defense upon 
the basis that there was negligence or mistake in 
the quotation of the rates. 
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Id, at 1097. The court explained that the statute prohibited any 
rebate regardless of the legal theory on which it was based, 
whether in tort or contract. The defendant in that case argued 
that the court should not rely on federal cases in making its 
determination; however, the court found these decisions to be 
applicable, noting the similarities between the state and federal 
The court in Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., supra, 
reached the same conclusion. The railroad brought an action to 
recover shipping charges that had not been included in the original 
invoice paid by the shipper. The trial court granted summary 
judgment for the railroad. Affirming the trial court's decision, 
the appellate court noted that Illinois law required carriers to 
recover the full charges imposed by tariffs. The court then noted 
that, except for that statute's provision, there was a "near 
vacuum" of Illinois law on the subject. Id., at 544. The court 
stated: 
Although we agree that the Interstate 
Commerce Act does not govern intrastate movements 
of commerce, the act and the Federal interstate 
cases are pertinent to an analysis of the instant 
appeal. We fail to discern how the fact that 
plaintiff's train did not pass over a state line 
makes any difference in the outcome of this case 
since the policy involved in the Interstate 
Commerce Act parallels that stated in the 
Illinois Public Utilities Act concerning the 
mandate that carriers must collect the fulL 
charges imposed by tariff so that no 
discrimination or preference will occur. 
49 U.S.C., §§ 1004, 1014 (1970). 
Id. at 545. 
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The foregoing cases are illustrative of state courts* 
interpretation of statutes prohibiting common carriers from 
charging or receiving rates different from those set forth in their 
published tariffs. While these cases explain the general rule of 
law governing these kinds of disputes, the rule has been more fully 
explored in federal cases under the Interstate Commerce Act. The 
Illinois Central and Denver and Rio Grande cases cited above have 
noted the applicability of the federal decisions because of the 
similarities between the federal and state statutes. 
(ii) Case Authority Interpreting the Federal Statute. 
In Walsky Construction Co. v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 
577 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1978), the Alaska Supreme Court applied the 
Interstate Commerce Act to a case where the quoted rate was 
significantly lower than the published tariff rate. The shipper 
paid the original invoice in accordance with the quoted rate. The 
carrier sued the shipper for the difference between the quoted rate 
and the tariff rate. 
The court noted that the Interstate Commerce Act forbids 
an interstate carrier from charging a rate different than its 
published tariff rate. The court explained: 
Uniformity in charges for transportation is the 
policy of this section [of the Act]. In an 
unbroken line of cases, the federal courts have 
held that this policy precludes a shipper from 
holding a common carrier to its word. Not by 
counterclaim, setoff, or separate claim upon 
theories of breach of contract, estoppel, 
negligent misrepresentation, or intentional 
misrepresentation may the shipper obtain a rate 
lower than the published tariff. The hardship of 
this rule on the unsuspecting shipper who often 
has neither the time nor the expertise necessary 
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to determine the applicable tariff is obvious and 
has been recognized. It may, in fact, be 
bankrupted by relying on a false quote. However, 
it is also a hardship on a shipper for its 
competitor to receive a lower freight rate than 
is available to the shipper. Section 6(7) of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, as interpreted by the 
foregoing authorities, reflects a congressional 
judgment that the latter hardship outweighs the 
former. 
Id. at 242-43 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). Section 6(7) of 
the Interstate Commerce Act provides, like the Utah statute, that 
carriers may not charge or collect compensation different from that 
specified in the tariff. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court's summary judgment for the carrier. 
Similarly, in Graves Truck Line, Inc. v. Hy Plains Dressed 
Beef, Inc., 204 Kan. 275, 462 P.2d 130 (1969), the carrier brought 
an action for the balance of the tariff rate. The shipper claimed 
a set-off based on the misrepresentations of the trucker. The 
court concluded that even if the carrier had been guilty of 
misrepresentation, it was still entitled to recover the full 
amount of the tariff rate, and the shipper was not entitled to any 
set-off. The court acknowledged that the result seemed harsh, but 
stated that the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act ^as to 
prevent discrimination or preference. 
For other cases in which the carrier was awarded the 
difference between the amount originally charged and the actual 
tariff rate, see, e.g., Aero Trucking, Inc. v. Regal Tube Co., 594 
F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1979) (the carrier's published tariff is the 
legal rate, and the rights of the parties as defined by the tariff 
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cannot be varied or enlarged by contract or tort of the carrier); 
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Bouziden, supra (no 
act or omission of a carrier will estop or preclude it from 
enforcing payment of the tariff rate); Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v. 
Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co., 166 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1948) cert. 
denied 334 U.S. 828, 92 L.Ed. 1756, 68 S.Ct. 1338 (1948) (no legal 
principle in the court's knowledge can estop a carrier from 
collecting payment in accordance with the tariff; in fact, the 
carrier is estopped from demanding or receiving, or the shipper 
from paying, less than the full rate); and Thompson v. Richards, 
158 Kan. 178, 146 P.2d 359 (1944) (neither the good faith of the 
parties when the erroneous charge was made nor the giving of a 
receipt marked "in full" is a defense to an action to recover the 
full tariff rate). 
(iii) Breach of Contract By a Carrier Is No Defense to 
the Collection of the Applicable Tariff Rate. 
American Salt, although citing no legal authority, argues 
that Hatch agreed to file for a lower tariff rate and that its 
failure to do so was a breach of contract which now bars it from 
collecting the applicable tariff rate. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 
17-18) . The contract provision on which American Salt relies is as 
follows: 
Carrier further agrees to obtain public 
liability, property damage, and cargo insurance 
with the miniumum coverage of Five Million 
Dollars ($5,000,000.00). Carrier shall also 
furnish and provide all licenses and permits 
required by State, Federal or local authorities; 
tax payments required of or on the equipment or 
on the use and operations thereof, and any taxes 
resulting from this Agreement or required by 
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Federal, state or local authorities, including 
any reports connected with such taxes, licenses, 
or insurance. (R. 0108) (emphasis added). 
This provision obviously requires that Hatch have "the 
licenses and permits" or authority to make intrastate hauls of 
salt. It has nothing to do with filing rates for the approval of 
the Commission. At the hearing before the Commission, the 
Administrative Law Judge, A. Robert Thurman, advised counsel for 
American Salt that the term "licenses and permits" relates to 
authority to haul the commodity involved and not to rates. 
(R. 0029). 
There was no agreement by Hatch to file for a special 
lower tariff rate; however, even assuming that there was and Hatch 
breached such agreement, such breach of contract does not bar Hatch 
from collecting the applicable tariff rate. 
As indicated hereafter, intentional misrepresentation or 
fraud is no defense to a carrier's right to collect the tariff 
rate. A fortiori, an alleged breach of contract can be no 
defense. The United States Supreme Court on many occasions has so 
held. In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Central. Iron & 
Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 44 S.Ct. 441, 68 L.Ed. 900 (3924), the court 
stated: 
The shipment being an interstate one, the 
freight rate was that stated in the tariff 
filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
The amount of the freight charges legally 
payable was determined by applying this tariff 
rate to the actual weight. Thus, they were 
fixed by law. No contract of the carrier could 
reduce the amount legally payable, or release 
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from liability a shipper who had assumed an 
obligation to pay the charges. Nor could any 
act or omission of the carrier (except the 
running of the Statute of Limitations) estop or 
preclude it from enforcing payment of the full 
amount by a person liable therefor. 
Id. at 902 (emphasis added). 
In the case New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. 
v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U.S. 406, 65 L.Ed. 1016 (1921), the 
United States Supreme Court, in enforcing a tariff rate, stated: 
"The consignee could not escape the liability imposed by law 
through any contract with the carrier." I_d. at 1020. 
The case of Bowser and Campbell v. Knox Glass, Inc., 390 
F.2d 193 (3rd Cir. 1968), on facts similar to those in this action, 
held that a breach of a contract to file for approval of an agreed 
rate is no defense to the collection of the tariff rate. The court 
stated: 
It is of no legal significance that the rate 
which the parties agreed upon among themselves 
would probably have been approved if it had 
been filed with the Commission. The forum for 
dealing with the schedule of charges is the 
Commission. . . . 
The innocence of the shipper in 
relying upon the carrier to obtain 
approval of the rate they had agreed on is 
equally unavailing. The rate filed is a 
matter of public record of which the 
shipper must take notice at his peril. 
The hardship which is urged upon us is one 
which has already been dealt with in cases 
involving common carriers and has been 
found inadequate to alter the policy 
underlying the integrity of the schedule 
of charges. Such instances of hardship 
may not be permitted to destroy the more 
far-reaching need to maintain respect for 
the rates established under the 
Commission's procedure and which other 
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shippers and contract and common carriers 
alike must be able to rely upon as 
realistic facts rather than a screen which 
conceals illegal private practices. 
The applicable rule cannot be 
circumvented by the reasoning, which the 
district court accepted, that the failure 
to file the rate agreed on with the 
shipper amounted to a breach of contract 
for which the damages are to be measured 
at precisely the amount of the under-
charges, thus eliminating the carrier's 
claim. In fact, the shipper filed no 
counterclaim for such damages. But 
regardless of this procedural element, to 
recognize a shipper's right to such 
damages would be to destroy the 
established principle by a change in form 
of the defense. Such a defense would not 
be available in an action by a common 
carrier, and since we have determined that 
the same principle must be maintained as 
to preferential charges by a contract 
carrier, it follows that the defense must 
be equally unavailing in the present 
action. 
Id. at 196-197 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 
It is clear that a breach of contract does not bar a 
carrier's right to collect the applicable tariff rate. American 
Salt has cited no authority to the contrary. 
(iv) Intentional Misrepresentation By a Carrier Does Not 
Foreclose It From Collecting the Applicable Tariff 
Rate. 
American Salt argues that before Hatch agreed to transport 
the salt, Hatch knew the route would be over a public road and 
suggests that this knowledge made Hatch guilty of aa intentional 
misrepresentation, or at least that it rebuts the finding of the 
Commission that Hatch was operating under a mistake of fact that 
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the haul was over a private road, (Appellant's Brief, pp. 9 and 
59). To support its argument, American Salt states that on at 
least two prior occasions, Hatch had transported salt for Morton 
Salt Company pursuant to a special tariff rate on file with the 
Commission. (Appellant's Brief, p. 59). 
The haul for Morton Salt was from the Amax ponds to 
Saltair, Utah and was over an interstate highway and therefore was 
clearly a regulated haul. (R. 0305). An application for a special 
tariff rate had been filed with and approved by the Commission. 
(R. 0305). The haul for American Salt was over a dirt road that 
was not marked as a public highway and Hatch was under the mistaken 
belief that the road was a private road. (R. 0325). Hatch only 
later discovered that the route included a public road which then 
required it, pursuant to Utah statute, to charge the applicable 
tariff rate. (R. 0328) . 
The claim that Hatch may have intentionally misled 
American Salt is without any factual support. However, even if the 
assertion of American Salt that Hatch knew beforehand that a public 
road was involved is true, this does not foreclose Hatch from 
collecting the applicable tariff rate. 
In F. Burkhart Manufacturing Co. v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. 
Co., 149 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1945), the court stated: 
This case is ruled by the opinion of this 
Court in Central Warehouse Co. v. Chicago, R.I. 
& P.R. Co., 8 Cir., 20 F.2d 828, which requires 
the affirmance of the judgment unless, as the 
appellant contends, the cases are 
distinguishable because of the fact that the 
undercharges in the Central Warehouse case 
resulted from a mistake of the carrier, while 
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in the instant case the undercharges were the 
result of a deliberate intent on the part of 
the appellee's agents to violate the law. But 
in the Central Warehouse case this Court said 
(page 829 of 20 F.2d): 
Congress, in order to eliminate 
every form of discrimination, has provided 
that there shall be permitted neither 
an intentional nor an unintentional 
deviation from the predetermined schedule 
of rates. . . . 
In that case it was, apparently, contended 
that if the failure to collect the tariff rate 
was due to a mistake on the part of the 
carrier, one in the situation of the appellant 
could not be compelled to pay, nor could the 
carrier be compelled to collect from it, the 
unpaid freight charges. This Court made it 
clear that the question whether the deviation 
from the tariff rates was intentional or not 
was of no legal importance in such an action as 
this. 
Id. at 910 (emphasis added). 
The Burkhart case was followed in a per curiam decision in 
the case of Consolidated Freightways Corporation v. Terry Tuck, 
Inc., 612 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1980), which affirmed a summary 
judgment in favor of the carrier: 
Consolidated Freightways sued Terry Tuck for 
an amount still owing under the applicable ICC-
approved tariff. Terry Tuck counterclaimed 
for fraud, alleging that the carrier knowingly 
misquoted the shipping rates. The district 
court granted Consolidated*s summary judgment 
motion for the amount still due, and it 
dismissed the counterclaim pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),, The facts are 
admittedly indistinguishable from those 
occurring in Aero Trucking, Inc. v. Regal Tube 
Co., 594 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1979); Pettibone v. 
Richardson, 126 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1942), and 
F. Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. 
Co., 149 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1945). We agree 
with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that no 
claim for relief can be predicated on a 
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carrier's alleged fraudulent misquotation of 
tariffs. Accordingly, the district court's 
judgment and order are AFFIRMED, 
Id. at 466. In Aero Trucking, Inc. v. Regal Tube Co., supra, the 
Court stated: 
Regal initially attempts to distinguish 
this case from the undercharge cases by 
asserting that the undercharge cases dealt with 
transportation charges while the instant case 
deals with 'an unnecessary additional charge 
that could and would have been avoided in 
connection with these shipments but for 
appellees1 fraud in the inducement.1 We find 
the alleged factual difference clearly 
insufficient. . . . 
* * * 
The type of discrimination alleged by 
Regal in this case is always present in 
underquotation situations. If a shipper has 
knowledge that the actual tariff is greater 
than the one quoted by the carrier it may well 
decide to alter its business operations in 
order to compensate for the higher rate. See, 
e.g., Pettibone v. Richardson, 126 F.2d 969 
(7th Cir. 1942). Regal argues, however, that 
it reasonably relied on Aero's fraudulent 
understatement of the detention charges. The 
short answer to this contention is, as it is in 
all undercharge cases, that the applicable 
tariffs are by law incorporated into the 
contract between shipper and carrier. Since 
the shipper is presumed to have knowledge of 
the applicable tariff rates, Regal cannot rely 
on Aero's statement that no detention charges 
would be assessed. As stated by the Supreme 
Court: 
The legal rights of shipper as 
against carrier in respect to a rate are 
measured by the published tariff. Unless 
and until suspended or set aside, this 
rate is made, for all purposes, the legal 
rate, as between carrier and shipper. The 
rights as defined by the tariff cannot be 
varied or enlarged by either contract or 
tort of the carrier. 
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Id, at 622-23 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
The foregoing authority is uniform, American Salt has 
quoted no contrary authority because there is none. Intentional 
misrepresentation or fraud does not bar a carrier from collecting 
the applicable tariff rate. 
These cases, and others like them, make it clear that 
Hatch must charge American Salt the applicable tariff rate for the 
services Hatch rendered. American Salt knew the haul was over a 
public road; Hatch did not. Hatch made a good faith error. Under 
these circumstances, Hatch must charge and collect the tariff rate. 
D. Public Policy As Announced By the Utah Public Service 
Commission Requires a Common Carrier to Charge and 
Collect the Applicable Tariff Rate. 
The Utah statute and the case law cited above are 
expressive of the public policy that regulated carriers are not 
free to charge any rate that they desire, but can only charge and 
collect those rates which have been specifically approved by the 
appropriate regulatory agency. The Commission, in its order 
denying American Salt's Application for Rehearing, announced that 
it adheres to this policy, even in the face of the "equitable 
arguments" of American Salt. 
The Commission stated: 
Notwithstanding our sympathy for 
Complainant's predicament, we are constrained 
by the force of case law relevant to the issues 
here to sustain our earlier order; nothing 
offered in the Application for Rehearing 
suggests that the case law has changed. The 
tariff rates must be charged and collected 
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unless prior specific authorization from this 
Commission is obtained. In the event that it 
is demonstrated that a carrier is intentionally 
misleading shippers to his pecuniary advantage, 
the Commission could and certainly would 
reconsider the fitness of such a carrier to 
hold an operating authority; however, that does 
not change the policy and requirement of law 
concerning tariffs and Complainant cannot be 
helped. 
(R. 0414) (Addendum, Exhibit B, p. 2) (emphasis added). 
The Commission has announced a policy that it will enforce 
the applicable tariff rates that it has approved. The Commission 
suggests that this public policy would be enforced, even where a 
carrier has intentionally misled a shipper. In such a case, the 
tariff would be enforced; but the Commission, pursuant to its 
regulatory authority, could reconsider the fitness of the carrier 
to hold operating authority. 
The Commission's enforcement of its approved tariffs 
gives order and consistency to the regulatory process, even though 
in a certain specific factual situation it may work a hardship 
upon a particular shipper. All of American Salt's "equitable 
arguments"1 as set forth in its Brief were made to the Commission, 
which considered them and rejected them in favor of a public policy 
enforcing the applicable tariff. 
!Hatch submits that American Salt's "equitable arguments" 
are not particularly persuasive because, as the Commission found, 
pursuant to the admission of counsel at the hearing, American Salt 
knew that the haul was to be over a public road. (R. 0028; 0345; 
Addendum, Exhibit B, p. 3). 
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This Court should not and cannot order the Commission to 
change its policy and adopt some flexible policy of tariff 
enforcement. It would be inappropriate for this Court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. The review and 
approval of tariff rates are specifically the prerogative of the 
Commission. This Court should not order the Commission to consider 
or to enforce agreements contrary to tariff rates where a common 
carrier has entered into such an agreement based upon a mistake of 
fact. 
This Court stated in the case of Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 
Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 264 (1966), that due to the responsibility 
imposed upon the Commission and its presumed knowledge and 
expertise, its findings and orders are endowed with a presumption 
of validity and correctness. The Court specifically stated: MIt 
is not our prerogative to pass upon the wisdom of the Commission's 
decision." Ld. at 266. 
In PBI Freight Service v. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 598 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1979), the Court stated: 
The Public Service Commission is charged 
with the duty of seeing that the public 
receives the most efficient and economical 
service possible. This requires consideration 
of all aspects of public interest, . . . 
Considerations of policy are primarily the 
responsibility of the Commission. It is well 
settled that this Court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the Commission. . . . 
Id. at 1354 (emphasis added). 
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In Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983), this Court stated: 
When the decision being reviewed 
represents the agency's weighing of competing 
values to select a particular goal, its 
interpretation of a special law, or its 
application of its findings of fact to a 
finding or conclusion on the 'ultimate facts' 
in the case, judicial review necessarily 
involves an independent judgment of the 
reasonableness of the agency decision. In 
these circumstances, reasonableness is measured 
against a specific standard: 'The 
reasonableness of the Commission's order must 
be determined in light of the statutory setting 
in which it operates.' Milne Truck Lines, Inc. 
v. Public Service Commission, 13 Utah 2d 72, 
75, 368 P.2d 590, 592 (1962). Thus, 
reasonableness must be determined with 
reference to the specific terms of the 
underlying legislation, interpreted in light 
of its evident purpose as revealed in the 
legislative history and in light of the public 
policy sought to be served. 
* * * 
There is an obvious difference between a 
reviewing court's substitution of its own 
preferences for the policy judgments of a 
commission, which is forbidden, and a court's 
reviewing commission decisions to assure that 
they fall within the outer limits of 
reasonableness as measured by the statutory 
language, purpose, and policy, which is its 
proper function. 
* * * 
Considerations of policy being primarily the 
responsibility of the Commission, PBI Freight 
Service v. Public Service Commission, supra, we 
give great weight to its conclusions on matters 
of this nature, and set its decision aside only 
if it is outside 'the tolerable limits of 
reason,' Silver Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, supra, or 'so unreasonable 
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that it must be deemed capricious and 
arbitrary.' Williams v. Public Service 
Commission, supra. 
Id. at 611 and 612 (emphasis added). 
The policy decision of the Commission to enforce approved 
tariffs is certainly not outside the "tolerable limits of reason." 
Accordingly, this Court cannot substitute its own poLicy 
preferences for the policy pronouncements of the Commission that 
tariff rates it has approved are to be enforced irrespective of 
other competing values. 
This case is simply a situation where a common carrier 
(Hatch) agreed to a rate lower than the applicable tariff rate 
based upon a mistake of fact that the haul was not over a public 
road. The shipper (American Salt) knew that the haul was over a 
public road. When Hatch discovered that the haul was over a public 
road, it charged American Salt the applicable tariff rate. The 
Commission, under these circumstances, has determined that the 
tariff rate must be enforced. There is no legal authority for this 
Court to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Public 
Service Commission. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The legal issue presented by American Salt Company's 
appeal is whether W.S. Hatch Co. can collect the tariff rate for 
transportation services rendered for American Salt in accordance 
with a tariff filed with and approved by the Utah Public Service 
Commission, notwithstanding an oral or written agreement of a lower 
rate based on a mistake of fact. The Utah statute requires a 
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regulated carrier to charge and collect the tariff rate. The Utah, 
federal and state case authority and the announced public policy of 
the Commission affirms this legal principle. American Salt's 
contention to the contrary is without any legal support or merit. 
WHEREFORE, the respondent, W.S. Hatch Co., respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the Report and Order of the Utah 
Public Service Commission dismissing the Petition of American Salt 
Company. 
Dated this // day of June, 1986. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Merlin 0. Baker 
Enid Greene 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
W.S. Hatch Company 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
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Exhibit A 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
AMERICAN SALT COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation, 
Complainant, 
vs. 
W. S. HATCH COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. 85-192-01 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Appearances: 
Merlin 0. 3aker 
Enid Greene 
Charles M. Bennett 
John L. Fellows 
ISSUED; September 12, 1935 
For W. S. Hatch Company 
" American Salt Company 
By the Commission: 
The hearing on W. S. Hatch Company's ("Hatch") Motion 
to Dismiss the Complaint filed against it by American Salt 
Company '"American Salt") was heard on July 2, 1985 at 10:00 a.m. 
before Administrative Law Judge A. Robert Thurman, at the Cornmis-
cion Offices, 4th Floor, Heber M. Wells State Office Building, 
160 East: 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Having been fully 
advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge enters the 
following Report containing proposed Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law, and the Order based thereon. 
INTRODUCTION 
From April 16, 1984 to l\ay 3, 1934, W. S. Har.ch Company 
(hereafter "Hatch") hauled 406 truck loads of salt, totalling 
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approximately 17,702 tons, for American Salt from the Ama:>: 
Magnesium Company ponds to the American Salt plant at 
Grantsville, Utah. Part of the haul was over a public highway of 
the state of Utah, a fact known by American Salt at the time the 
haul took place., but which Hatch did not know, mistakenly believ-
ing the entire haul to be over private roads and thus not subject 
to regulation by this Commission. Hatch charged less than its 
tariff rate for the haul because of the mistake. 
After the haul ended, Hatch d«iscoveied the mistake-and 
billed American Salt for Hatch's services according to the tariff 
rate then on file with and 'approved by this Commission. American 
S-~.lt refused to pay the amount billed, basing its refusal on an 
alleged oral agreement of a rate lover than the published tariff 
rate. 
Hatch filed suit in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah seeking payment for its transportation 
services according to the tariff rate. .American Salt immediately 
thereafter filed a Verified Complaint and Application for Relief 
from Excessive Charges with this Commission, claiming that 
r-itVs tariff rate was unreasonable and unjust under the circum-
stances. 
The petitioner, American Salt, filed a verified peti-
tion setting forth certain facts en which it based its alle-
g" lions that the published tariff rate v-as unjust and unreason-
able under the circumstances. Hatch, in support of its Motion to 
Dismiss, filed supporting affidavit?. 
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In view of the verified complaint and affidavits filed 
herein, and the factual admissions of the parties, the 
Commission, in accordance with Rule 12 fb) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, will consider Hatch's Motion to Dismiss as a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission finds that there is no genuine issue as 
to the following material facts: 
1. The haul performed by Hatch for American Salt was 
made, in part, over a. public road of the state of Utah. 
2. American Salt knew that part of the haul was over a 
public road at the time the haul took place. Hatch believed 
the haul to be made entirely over private roads. 
3. Hatch hauled 406 loads of salt from the Arnax 
Magnesium Company Ponds to the American Salt plant at 
Grantsville, Utah, averaging 43.6 tons each, totalling 
approximately 17,701.60 tons. 
4. At the time of the haul, Hatch had a salt tariff on 
file that had been properly submitted to and approved by 
this Commission. The Public Service Commission has examined 
and approved Hatch's salt tariff on numerous occasions. The 
Commission has found tne salt tariff to be just and reason-
able . 
5. Patch's tariff rate for salt was $.35 per hundred 
weight at the time of the haul. 
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6. The cost for the services Hatch performed for 
American Salt, calculated according to the tariff rate, was 
$123,911.20, plus applicable dead-heading charges. 
7. No application was made to this Commission to 
change the. tariff rate applicable to this haul. 
8. American Salt made payments to Hatch in the total 
amount of $33,667.40, leaving an unpaid balance of 
$90,243.80 plus dead-heading charges. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Annotated § 54-5-3 (1953) specifically 
r:^ ~vi~£s that a cordon motor carrier operating any motor vehicle 
within the state of Utah may not transport either persons or 
property for compensation over the public highways except in 
accordance with the provisions of the Utah Motor Carrier Act. 
2. Utah Code Annotated § 54-3-6 (2) (1953) further 
provides that no common carrier shall charge, demand, collect, or 
receive compensation different from that specified in the tariffs 
filed with the Commission and in effect at the time transporta-
tion services are rendered. 
3. Under the law, American Salt is charged with the 
kriC-v'ledqe rhat any haul over the Utah public highways is subject 
to trie laws of nhe state of Utah and, therefore, to the applica-
*0^ tariff provisions on file with and approved by this 
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4. The salt tariff on file with the Commission is fair 
and reasonable, and Hatch is legally required to collect the 
charges for transportation services as provided in said tariff. 
5. Any oral or written agreements to charge a rate 
higher or lower than the published tariff rate, even assuming 
that such was agreed to by Hatch and American Salt, is void and 
unenforceable. 
6. Any agreement or representation by Hatch that it 
would accept less than the applicable tariff rate in payment for 
its services, assuming such agreement or representation was made, 
is also void and unenforceable. 
7. American Salt is required under the laws of the 
State of Utah to pay the tariff rate for the transportation 
services performed and other charges as set forth in said tariff. 
Hatch is entitled to compensation for its services in the amount 
of $123,911.20 for the salt hauled, together with all other costs 
as provided by its applicable tariff, less the payments previous-
ly made by American Salt. 
ORDER 
NOT", THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Respondent 
W. s. Hatch Company's Motion to Dismiss the Verified Complaint 
filed against it by American Salt Company is granted and said 
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of 
September, 1935. 
/s/ A. Robert Thurman 
Administrative Law Judge 
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Approved and confirmed this 12 th day of September, 
1985, as the Report and Order of the Commission. 
/s/ Brent K. Cameron, Chairman 
(SEAL) Is! James K. Byrne, Commissioner 
I si Brian T. Stewart, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Georgia 3. Peterson, Secretary 
Exhibit B 
DEC 2 7 1985 
& hfcucKER 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
AMERICAN SALT COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation. 
Complainant. 
vs. 
W.S. HATCH COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. 85-192-01 
ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
ISSUED: December 24. 1985 
BY THE COMMISSION: 
On September 12. 1985 the Commission issued its 
Report and Order in this matter dismissing the 
Complainant's Complaint on the basis that the Respondent 
carrier. W.S, Hatch Company ("Hatch"), is required by law 
to charge and collect for its transportation services in 
accord with its tariff on file with the Commission. On 
October 2. 1985 Complainant filed with the Commission an 
Application for Rehearing setting forth a number of 
alleged errors in the Commission's Order. 
We do not disagree with Complainant's 
characterization of the result in this case as being harsh 
and, at least from its perspective, unfair. Complainant 
contracted to pay—and doubtless budgeted accordingly— 
one amount only to find that when time came for payment. 
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it owed three or four times what it had anticipated. The 
only basis for the increase in charges is the fact that 
the service was performed over a public and not a private 
roadway; the increase was not based upon increased costs 
to Respondent. 
Notwithstanding, our sympathy for Complainantfs 
predicament, we are constrained by the force of case law 
relevant to the issues here to sustain our earlier order; 
nothing offered in the Application for Rehearing suggests 
that the case law has changed. The tariff rates must be 
charged and collected unless prior specific authorization 
from this Commission is obtained. In the event that it is 
demonstrated that a carrier is intentionally misleading 
shippers to his pecuniary advantage, the Commission could 
and certainly would reconsider the fitness of such a 
carrier to hold an operating authority; however, that does 
not change the policy and requirement of law concerning 
tariffs and Complainant cannot be helped. 
It may be that Complainant has an action 
cognizable by the general jurisdiction courts of this 
state and we would encourage Complainant to analyze 
whether they may have redress in that forum. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City. Utah, this 24th day of 
December. 1985. 
/s/ Brent H. Cameron. Chairman 
(SEAL) /s/ James M. Byrne. Commissioner 
/s/ Brian T. Stewart. Commissioner 
Attest: 
/s/ Georgia B. Peterson 
Executive Secretary 
